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Electronic Medical Records and Risk Management in Hospitals of 
Saudi Arabia 
Electronic Medical Records (EMR) systems and the associated risks have been 
well studied in developed countries; the same cannot be said for systems in 
developing countries. Previous research in Saudi Arabia healthcare organisations 
has shown a low level of quality in hospital services due to ineffective risk 
management. The objective of this research is to apply the Systems Theoretic 
Accident Modelling and Processes (STAMP) risk management technique in 
Saudi Arabia and evaluate its implementation. A two- phase case study in a 
healthcare organisation in Saudi Arabia was conducted. The first phase 
implemented the STAMP technique to identify and manage risks to the system. 
For the second phase the STAMP technique was extended to include a Checklist, 
to increase STAMP’s capability to mitigate risks, and the process reapplied. The 
results demonstrated that the inclusion of the STAMP Checklist (STAMPC) 
reduced errors and prevented system failures compared to regular STAMP.  
Keywords: Electronic medical records (EMR); Risk management (RM); Saudi 
Arabia (SA); STAMP Checklist   (STAMPC) 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, medical systems have undergone transformative changes. The 
integration of electronic medical records (EMR), picture archiving and communication 
systems (PACS), electronic prescribing (ePrescribing), associated computerised 
provider (or physician) order entry systems (CPOE), and computerised decision support 
systems (CDSSs) has increased the organisational complexity [1]. This situation 
requires increased risk management capacity in the healthcare system in order to 
improve their ability to provide safe, quality care to patients and families, and to protect 
hospital performance against systems failures [2]. 
Risk management is a demanding and challenging aspect of government 
electronic programmes across many sectors. Risk management is recognised as essential 
to the success of business, healthcare and project management, as it can save time, 
reduce costs and eliminate potential failures before damage occurs [3]. There has been 
extensive research carried out on the benefits of risk management. It identifies 
favourable alternative courses of action, increases confidence in achieving project 
objectives, enhances chances of success as well as reduces doubts and duplication of 
efforts [4]. An effective risk management programme in health sectors, or elsewhere, 
allows better understanding of the risk involved in any initiative and allows more 
informed decisions to be made [5]. In healthcare, the increasing number and severity of 
medical errors attributable to interactions with medical equipment have led healthcare 
providers to recognise the importance of risk management. EMR systems have been 
widely adopted in developed countries with the associated risks well studied [6-10]. 
However, there have been fewer studies on risk management in developing countries, 
although some work has been done [11]. 
A number of techniques have been developed to analyse system incidents and 
failures, such as Brainstorming [12], Root Cause Analysis (RCA) [13], Failure Mode 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [14], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [15, 16], Binary 
Decision Diagrams (BDD) [17], Goal Structuring Notations (GSN) [18, 19], Generic 
Security Templates (GST) [20, 21] and Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and 
Processes (STAMP) [22, 23]. In this research, STAMP is applied to conduct risk 
management of EMR systems. The technique has been applied to analyse many safety 
related cases and accidents [22], across sectors such as rail transport [24], water [25] 
and oil production [26] and is used by many organisations, such as the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). STAMP has been chosen for the 
following reasons: 1) it focuses on unsafe conditions or actions; 2) it incorporates the 
notion that a safety accident might include external disturbances; and 3) it includes both 
developing and operational structures [27]. 
The objectives of this paper were to (1) implement the STAMP technique to 
manage risks in a hospital in the KKGH Riyadh Region and evaluate if STAMP can 
reduce the failure rate in the hospital; (2) adapt and enhance the STAMP technique to 
mitigate risks; and (3) implement the enhanced STAMP in the same hospital in the 
KKGH Riyadh Region and evaluate whether the enhanced version can reduce the 
failure rate in the hospital. This article makes the following contributions, 
• Implements and evaluates of the STAMP risk management technique in a 
hospital in the KKGH Riyadh Region. 
• Enhances STAMP by adding a Checklist component to support and strengthen 
the capability to mitigate risks. 
• Quantifies the improvement of STAMPC over STAMP. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents related 
work; section 3 discusses the methodologies; section 4 implements STAMP, whilst 
section 5 introduces, evaluates and compares our improved technique, STAMPC; and 
section 6 summarises this paper. 
2. Related work 
2.1. EMR Adoption 
EMR systems have seen an increase in use by a number of countries.  In the United 
States of America (USA), EMR systems have been used since the late 1960s [28]. 
Systems were used for processing patient information from admission through to 
discharge. In 2009, the president of the United States stated  “To lower healthcare cost, 
cut medical errors, and improve care, we’ll computerize the nation’s health records in 
five years, saving billions of dollars in healthcare costs and countless lives”. In total the 
US government has spent $36 billion on computerising the Medicare and Medicaid 
projects using certified EMR, and it was estimated that 90% of the physicians and 70% 
of the hospitals would become “meaningful users” in ten years’ time [29]. A recent 
report provided by the Office of National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology tracked the adoption of EMR from 2008 to 2015 [30]. The results showed 
that 96% of hospitals were using certified EMR technology by 2015. Adoption rates of 
EMR in small, rural hospitals continued to lag behind [31], although they have been 
steadily increasing in recent years [30]. 
Another example of the effective usage of EMR systems is Taiwan. The Bureau 
of National Health Insurance (BNHI), owned by the government, was aware of the 
importance of the new technology in the health arena with Taiwan’s Association for 
Medical informatics research group developing an EMR system structure [32]. In 2004, 
the BNHI distributed smart cards to every individual with the aim of reducing fraud and 
improving healthcare quality. In addition to tracking medical information, these smart 
cards stored a lot of useful healthcare information, including prescriptions, medical 
procedures, drug allergy history, vaccination records and information about organ 
donation [33]. The implementation of the EMR system in Taiwan has helped healthcare 
professionals enhance patient care and clinical services [34]. 
Oman has also deployed an integrated EMR, designed to replace paper-based 
manual medical records system in health institutions. The Ministry of Health (MOH) 
introduced the project in 1990. The deployment started in primary healthcare centres 
and then rolled out to hospitals. Oman’s EMR system covers registration, nursing 
records, physician entries, billing and nursing work reporting [11]. Moreover, it offers 
support in medical decision making, encourages the use of guidelines, and enhances 
coordination between different healthcare providers [35]. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) categorised Oman’s healthcare system in 2000 as the most well 
organised system in the world in terms of outcomes. However, despite the system 
having been up and running since 1996 there are areas requiring improvement, such as 
confidentiality and quality of outcomes [11]. 
In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the MOH was established in 1950 and 
its main objectives were to establish hospitals, dispensaries and other curative facilities. 
60% of the medical services are provided by the MOH, while the rest of the services are 
provided by government bodies and other private service providers [36]. EMR has been 
used for decades in KSA. It provides benefits to physicians, ancillary departments, 
patients and management of almost all levels [37]. Saudi medical service providers have 
been increasingly relying on EMR [36, 37]. KSA lacks an integrated national network 
for medical records, due to the use of independent EMRs by different medical service 
providers. This has resulted in a number of both technical and human challenges. These 
include, but are not limited to economic, technical, organisational, legal, regulatory, and 
behavioural barriers [36, 37, 38]. Fortunately, a coordinated effort is in place to tackle 
those challenges and barriers, such as the establishment of the Saudi Association for 
Health Informatics [36]. 
2.2. Security Risk Management Techniques 
Security Risk Management has been well studied from both technical and social 
perspectives [39, 40, 41]. 
Effective risk management activities require a systematic approach to evaluate 
and control the entire process. Risk management can be summarised into five steps: risk 
identification, risk analysis, risk assessment, risk planning and monitoring [42, 43]. 
Understanding the causes of system incidents and failures is important for safety and 
quality programmes in hospitals, as well as other organisations. A number of techniques 
have been developed to achieve this. Brainstorming [12] is a traditional technique used 
for generating creative ideas through sharing allowing the identification of potential 
causes of problems and risks. RCA is an investigative procedure using a ‘total system’ 
approach, aimed at exploring the root causes of failures [13]. FMEA is a proactive risk 
assessment technique [14] employing a structured approach for forecasting and 
identifying the consequences of system failures [44] to identify the possible effects of 
individual failures within a system [45]. FTA was developed in the 1960s by Bell 
Telephone Laboratories and was used effectively in missile safety control systems [15, 
16]. The BDD technique was introduced by Bryant and subsequently developed by 
Rauzy, to address the weaknesses of the conventional FTA approach [46]. 
Most of the RM techniques have been developed based on the belief that the 
most common reasons for accidents or event occurrence involve the failure of humans, 
equipment or environments to act or behave as expected [47]. However, few techniques 
have addressed the processes of interactions between human and machines [48]. 
STAMP, developed by Leveson, is based on a constraint-based model, focussing on the 
interaction between system components [23], characterising all risks to humans, 
organisations and equipment. It considers not only traditional physical failures but also 
dysfunctional interactions between non-failing components, errors in human decision 
making, diversified organisational contexts as well as unwanted situations due to 
inadequate enforcement of system constrains [23]. The technique has been helpful in 
assessing, analysing and preventing past and future accidents in electronic systems. This 
paper explains how STAMP could be adapted to meet the needs of a healthcare 
organisation in Saudi Arabia. 
3. Methodology 
A longitude case study was performed for this research, utilising a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods for data collection and analysis. The study 
lasted for six months and was carried in two phases in order to implement, revise and 
evaluate STAMP. This method allowed researchers to maintain a holistic overview of a 
‘real life’ implementation over a period of time. 
The first phase of the case study, documented in Section 4, implemented STAMP within 
the organisation. A real world incident is used to explain how to implement STAMP. 
The failure rate over two months was observed to identify any reduction during the 
implementation of STAMP. The second phase, documented in Section 5, revised 
STAMP by adding a checklist. This checklist was used to address deficiencies identified 
within the first phase. A further observation lasting two months was then performed to 
identify any improvements attributable to the implementation of the STAMP Checklist 
(STAMPC). As a follow up, the study continued for another two consecutive months 
during which the hospital continued using STAMPC. Finally, failure rates pre- and 
post- STAMPC implementation were considered. 
In addition to the above-mentioned measurement, 224 checklists from 28 departments 
were collated during the second phase. Analysis of the correlation between different 
components within the checklist provided further understanding of interactions between 
different procedures. 
To ensure that the investigation took place in an ethical manner consent letters were 
attached with the above-mentioned case study, clearly stating that participation in the 
study was voluntary, and that there was no penalty associated with subjects declining to 
participate. The Ethics Committee of the University has approved this study. The next 
few sections introduce this case study in detail. 
4. Case Study - Phase 1 
The objective of this phase was to explore the implementation of a risk management 
technique, STAMP, in a hospital and demonstrate the validity of this technique for 
EMR system failure prevention. 
4.1. Implementation of STAMP 
In STAMP, accidents are conceived as resulting not from component failures, but 
rather, from inadequate control or enforcement of safety-related constraints on the 
design, development, and operation of the system. STAMP is constructed from three 
basic concepts: constraints, hierarchical levels of control, and process models. These 
concepts, in turn, lead to a classification of control flaws that can lead to accidents. 
Leveson’s STAMP-based accident analysis introduces to the following steps, (1) 
construct the hierarchical conceptual structure and identify the constraints (Section 4.2); 
(2) identify the causes involved in the failure (Section 4.3). This should start from the 
technical process and use the general application knowledge to identify ineffective 
interaction issues involved in any failure; and (3) determine the adequacy of the 
constrains imposed.  In most of the cases, the constraints were not identified or 
inadequately enforced along with other associated deficiencies of human decision-
making and behaviour issues (Section 4.4 and 4.5). 
4.2. The hierarchical conceptual structure 
The current conceptual hierarchical control structure for ensuring safe operation of an 
EMR system in a hospital in Saudi is detailed below. This conceptual hierarchical 
structure consists of five levels: 1) the MOH, which provides rules (recognised as 
primary rules), budgets and standards; 2) the Directorate of Health Affairs (DOHA); 3) 
the Hospital Manager; 4) the IT Unit; and 5) the End Users (or human indicator), the 
Administration and the Process (automated loop control). The policies are established 
by the top level (MOH) and are communicated to the lower levels. This approach is 
useful for finding, describing and analysing the reasons for lack of communication 
between different levels. 
 
Figure 1. Classification of control flaw leading to failure check [23, 49] 
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Figure 1 depicts a hierarchical conceptual structure, where each stage imposes 
constraints on the activities of the stage below. We applied STAMP to ensure the safe 
operation of the EMR system, quality of service in hospitals and to identify risks 
leading to system failure. Downward communication channels provide the information 
necessary to impose behavioural constraints on the stage below; upward feedback 
channels provide information about how successfully these constraints have been 
imposed, as well as information about reported incidents. 
The MOH provides budgets, laws and standards as well as policies and 
procedures for the Directorates of Health Affairs (DOHA). These, in addition to any 
guidelines, must be imposed on Hospital Managers who must ensure the 
implementation of these elements in all departments within the hospital. 
The lower levels in this conceptual control structure include the IT administrator 
and systems end users, who are responsible for providing all types of reports, in 
addition to having direct control of the entire automated system. The IT unit is 
responsible for operating the system and providing safe operation requirements. End 
users are responsible for using the workstations and equipment correctly, in accordance 
with the training provided by the IT department. They must also convey information 
about incidents to the IT administrator or to the corresponding hospital manager and 
cooperate during the addressing of these incidents. 
The hospital manager is responsible for establishing, implementing and 
controlling regulations, rules and guidelines to be followed in the hospital. In addition to 
making sure that the standards are effectively implemented, the hospital manager must 
report any uncontrollable accidents to the DOHA, who subsequently must report about 
accidents to the MOH. The MOH is also responsible for making changes to the policies, 
standards and regulations and then communicating these changes to the DOHA. In some 
special cases, the MOH sends direct commands to IT Administrators. Following this 
model clear layers of responsibility, procedures and tasks have been defined.  STAMP 
allows the identification of any breakdown in the model and processes outlined above. 
Hospitals demand resources, such as funding, high quality medical equipment, 
rules, procedures, standards, effective managers and well-trained staff to manage their 
day-to-day activities. In many cases, rules are provided by governmental bodies, 
stakeholders and others. In our case, all rules are provided by the upper level or stage 
and imposed on the stages below. 
4.2.1 Organisation of the Case Study 
King Khalid General Hospital (KKGH) is located in the city of Riyadh.  KKGH serves 
more than 650,000 people and has a capacity of 400 beds. It has been designated as a 
referral hospital for six other general hospitals and 20 Primary Health Care Centres 
(PHCCs) in the area. Until recently, not all of the facilities were electronically 
connected, and communication between the hospitals and the PHCCs is still performed 
manually. In January 2007 the MOH decided to computerise 30 hospitals throughout the 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with KKGH one of those chosen for the scheme. KKGH 
started using an EMR system in 2009 in almost all of its 28 clinical units (for example, 
in its emergency, outpatient, in-patient, radiology, laboratory, pharmacy and medical 
record departments). EMR was also utilised in non-clinical units, such as the patient 
registration, administration and discharge units. Implementation and operation of the 
EMR was conducted following the formal hierarchical structure, as described above 
(MOH, DOHA, Hospital Manager, IT Unit and IT provider), 
4.2.2 The Failure at KKGH 
At 6:30 am on the 26 October 2010 the EMR system suddenly failed. End users 
informed the IT department immediately by telephone and requested that the system be 
restored. Night duty technicians reported the incident verbally to staff starting at 7:30 
am, with action immediately initiated to restore the system. At approximately 7:40 am, 
the IT Administrator sent a request form to the provider asking for more qualified 
technicians to allow the determination of the root cause and identify the associated risk 
factors regarding the failure. As a result, actions to restore the system were delayed for 
approximately two hours.  Additional factors contributed to the delay, including the lack 
of experienced computer technicians in the unit, pointing to serious problems in human 
resources management. The system was finally operational again approximately three 
hours after the incident had been reported. Fortunately, there was no serious impact on 
patients; however, serious attention needed to be given to investigating the failure, its 
causes, and the ineffective response to the situation. 
The cause(s) of the failure proved difficult to determine, as KKGH did not have 
a properly documented incident reporting system. Also, no RM techniques were used to 
identify risks and prevent failures. The initial cause of the system failure was attributed 
to damage to some part of the server, which resulted in its breakdown. Technicians 
changed the damaged parts and restored the system with the help of an IT equipment 
provider. Fortunately, according to the IT departments report, no data were lost thanks 
to the backup systems in place. 
According to hospitals’ records, no investigation into the root causes for this 
system failure took place. However, many division heads did not accept that damaged 
components were the only cause for the failure; they questioned why the system was 
failing almost every week. The likelihood of this being the only cause of failure is 
questionable. There were potentially many other factors involved in the failure, which 
were beyond the control of the IT department or end users. Therefore, we used the 
STAMP technique to identify the external and internal root causes of the system failure,  
mitigate or control current risks and prevent future failures of the EMR system. 
4.3. Causal Investigation 
Causal analysis starts from the technical process and uses general application 
knowledge to identify any ineffective interactions and communication issues involved 
in the failures. Based upon the investigation of this case, system risks relating to the 
failure were identified as follows: patients  service delays; secondly, there was a lack of 
information exchange between care providers; and complications could occur as a result 
of late medical action. The system should not be turned off during busy working times 
should only be run by trained users. In addition, the users should understand policies, 
procedures and guidelines and report incidents immediately. 
By using the STAMP technique, it was determined that the failure was not 
solely due to technical errors. Other factors also contributed to the system failure, such 
as the lack of periodic and timely maintenance. No documented maintenance schedule 
for the hardware or infrastructure appears to exist. Moreover, because end users did not 
systematically report incidents, upper levels were not receiving feedback on what was 
happening. Mistakes occurred at all levels of the hierarchy leading to the following 
suggested policies and constraints that the MOH should mandate in all hospitals across 
KSA. 
4.4. Adequate policies mandated by MOH (identified using STAMP) 
Well-developed policies are the fundamental requirements for the hospital to ensure the 
healthcare and related activities are performed safely and effectively. This subsection 
discusses existing MOH policies for EMR systems and RM. We present the existing 
MOH rules imposed on the lower levels of the hospital hierarchy, which are at the core 
of its day-to-day operations. We have identified the rules that were not followed (-) and 
followed (+) at the hospital, 
• (+) IT providers must train all users about the use of the system and its safety; 
• (+) IT providers are responsible for fixing any defects in the system, for the 
entire period of the contract; 
• (-) The operation and maintenance contract must be renewed every three years 
before the end of the previous agreement; 
• (-) A supervisory and feedback loop must be provided to ensure that each 
healthcare provider’s manager is doing his job adequately; 
• (+) An electronic medical record must be generated for every patient of the 
hospital; 
• (-) The periodic maintenance report must be sent from the lower levels (IT 
department) to the higher levels; 
• (+) Any additional system enhancement requests, issued by key hospital 
personnel, should be developed and implemented by IT providers; 
• (-) Feedback about the system operation and its faults must be reported to the 
higher levels in the organisational hierarchy; 
• (-) Risks must be identified and treated; 
• (+) Correct modification or enhancement of the EMR is required. 
4.5. Inadequate Policies Enforced by the MOH and IT Unit (Identified using 
STAMP) 
By using the STAMP technique, we found that the MOH policies lack information 
about the security management, risk assessment and incident response in the hospital. 
These included, 
• Inadequate incident reporting to the hospital manager from both the IT 
department and end users; 
• Inadequate constraints imposed by the IT manager on the users; 
• Inadequate periodic maintenance of both hardware and software; 
• Lack of feedback between the IT department and other department at different 
hierarchy levels; 
• Improper identification and management of risks. 
In this investigation we determined the most likely causes of the EMR system 
failure at KKGH: incomplete risk identification process; inadequate periodic 
maintenance; lack of effective feedback from managers to the lower levels; lack of 
effective policies; and inability to identify serious potential risks. The responsibility for 
a system failure generally lies within the top-level manager of hospital, who in this case 
did not pay much attention to risk management and failure prevention processes. 
4.6. Failure Rates and Reasons for Enhancing the STAMP 
The term of failure is defined as the system’s inability to meet a specific stakeholder 
and user’s expectation [50, 51]. This hospital defines failure as inability of the system to 
fulfil its duties, which negatively impacted the organisation’s medical services. The 
failure rate was measured by the frequency of failures per week. Through observation, 
we found that the use of the original STAMP technique did not reduce the (weekly) 
system failure rate, and it was inadequate with respect to imposing constraints to 
prevent incidents. Periodic maintenance was not conducted either. This finding was not 
a surprise as the goals of the original STAMP technique were “to assist and understand 
why incidents occur ” [23]. It does not have the capability to manage and mitigate risks, 
thereby preventing potential failures caused by the deficiencies identified in previous 
sections. 
We therefore identified the necessity to improve the current STAMP technique 
in a way that it can address the deficiencies by improving the completeness and 
consistency of incident reports, ensuring steady process improvement, enhancing and 
encouraging users and the unit’s directors for reporting incidents, reducing 
complications and prompting the appropriate management at each level. Section 5 
introducs the revised STAMP and its implementation in the same organisation. 
5. Case Study – Phase 2 
5.1. Enhancing the STAMP Technique with a Checklist 
Our idea to enhance the STAMP technique was prompted by our findings in Case Study 
Phase 1. We decided to add a checklist to address those deficiencies. Existing work 
shows that many high-technology industries, such as aviation and manufacturing quality 
control, rely heavily on checklists to help reduce human and technical errors. For 
example, Ziewacz et al. [52] stated that checklists are the standards in managing 
aviation and other high-reliability industry emergencies: their use helps to prioritise and 
standardise actions [53]. However, checklists have not achieved widespread use for 
healthcare failures [52]. 
Hales and Pronovost summarised the benefits of using checklists. The checklists 
can provide guidance to users, verify a task to ensure failures are avoided, and provide a 
framework to evaluate a process. In addition, they help to ensure adherence to ‘best 
practice’ [54]. Hundreds of organisations, including the American College of Physicians 
and Surgeons (ACP&S) and the America n Society of Anaesthesiologists (ASA), have 
supported the use of checklists for reducing errors, morbidity and mortality [55, 56]. 
Thus, we modified the STAMP technique by including a checklist, while ensuring that 
this amendment was incorporated without affecting or interfering with the design 
methods of the original technique. 
5.2. Development of the STAMPC Risk Management Technique 
The STAMPC development was based on a literature search and the findings of the 
Case Study Phase 1. The initial draft of the technique was documented and circulated 
for expert review in the Software Technology Research Laboratory (STRL) at De 
Montfort University (DMU). A few modifications were made to the first draft. The 
added checklist had 15 questions (Appendix A). The checklist was also presented to an 
audience at the Saudi Scientific International Conference in the UK for further 
feedback. 
Figure 2 illustrates the main features of the STAMP Checklist (STAMPC). 
Similar to Figure 1, the structure takes into account the EMR’s system operations and 
shows the communication between different hierarchical levels. We included the 
checklist component named “RM STAMP Checklist”, which can capture incident and 
operating items. We also added a feedback mechanism named “Paper feedback” and 
incident report processes associated with the checklist. The STAMPC was implemented 
with support from the IT, quality improvement and EMR Unit Managers along with 
other users at KKGH in Al-Khar
 
Figure 2. Classification of control flaws leading to failure (STAMP Checklist based on STAMP); an 
analysis of EMR systems using the STAMPC technique. 
5.3. The STAMPC Technique and its Practical Application for EMR 
The STAMPC passed through accreditation of the Central Board for Accreditation of 
Healthcare (CBAHI). The quality management programme, EMR system and safety 
policies and standards were effectively endorsed, implemented and communicated to 
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Figure 8.3.1 Classification of control flaws leading to failure (STAMP Checklist based on STAMP); an analysis
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users and staff across the hospital. The implementation of STAMPC was relatively 
straightforward. The trial was conducted over a period of two months. 
The steps of this trial were as follows: 1) we organised a meeting with the unit 
heads, who volunteered to participate in the study and provide feedback on the contents; 
2) we gave a presentation about the value of the STAMPC technique for managing risks 
and preventing failures; and 3) we made sure that the policies, standards and the 
incident reporting forms were in place that end users were aware of them and that the 
EMR system provider was informed about the importance of periodic maintenance. A 
formal schedule was proposed and agreed upon; the hospital director agreed to verify 
and follow up on the application of the added checklist. 
Before the formal launch of the use of the checklist, we gave a short presentation 
that described the background of the technique and provided some basic guidelines for 
using the checklist. Nearly all EMR system users in the hospital received this overview. 
The Quality and Safety Committee team members of the hospital were asked to 
volunteer for a series of tasks, including assisting us in distributing and collecting the 
completed checklists weekly and to make sure that the IT department reported feedback. 
Once the checklist and the implementation process had been introduced and mandated 
in all departments, a copy of the checklist was sent to each department. We requested 
the checklist to be filled in and returned to us for analysis. The units were given the 
option to store the forms in a box on site, which was also available to us. We closely 
monitored each unit to ensure that the checklist and the incident reports were used when 
necessary. In addition, feedback was requested from the IT department after the task 
was completed. The lead researcher took care to ensure that every participant was 
comfortable with his or her role and actions and provided feedback to them. 
5.4. STAMPC evaluation results 
This subsection reports our findings from the application of the STAMPC technique at 
KKGH. A total of 224 checklists were completed over the 2-month period (112 for each 
month). Our sampling included all departments in the hospital that were using the EMR 
system. A total of 28 departments were included in the survey: 27 clinical and one 
nonclinical (the Admission and Discharge Unit). Before using the STAMP Checklist, 
we predicted that system maintenance would decrease the rate of system failures and 
maximise the quality of the hospital’s performance. All completed checklists were 
collected and analysed using Pearson correlation in SPSS in order to identify the 
relationship between different variables (i.e. questions in the checklist). 
Outcomes of the analysis conducted using the Pearson correlation coefficient are 
shown in Table 1. We coded the answers for all 15 questions, using 1 for “Yes” -1 for 
“No” and 0 for “I do not know”. This coding was suitable for most questions except for 
Question 11, for which, we coded “1” for maintenance performed every 6 months, “0” 
for maintenance performed every 12 months and “-1” for “maintenance never done”. 
The correlation table shows that there is significant correlation between the answers for 
Questions 1, 2, and 3. In addition, there is a weak negative correlation between the 
answers for Questions 11 and 12, which implies that any increase in the frequency of 
maintenance will lead to a decrease in the failure rate. 
 
Table 1.   Correlation between the variables 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q11 Q12 
Q1 Pearson Correlation 1 .454** .521** .504** .021 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .750 
Q2 Pearson Correlation .454** 1 1.521** .377** .036 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .592 
Q3 Pearson Correlation .521** .551** 1 .472** .082 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .222 
Q11 Pearson Correlation .504** .377** .472** 1 -.073 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .276 
Q12 Pearson Correlation .021 .036 .082 -.073 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .750 .592 .222 .276  
 
5.5. Failure Rates Analysis and Comparisons 
Through observation, we found that during the time that the checklist was applied, the 
EMR system failure rate fell considerably to only one per month. This is considered to 
be a significant achievement. The IT department performed its job perfectly; in 
particular, periodic maintenance for both hardware (HW) and software (SW) was 
performed on time and according to the plan. Users have started to use the formal 
incident reporting form regularly and all users have received immediate feedback after 
actions were taken. Recall our findings in Section 4. The use of the original STAMP 
technique failed to reduce the (weekly) system failure rate, and it was inadequate with 
respect to imposing constraints to prevent incidents. Existing work has shown that the 
use of checklists can improve safety and help to manage system failures [52]. One 
characteristic of the STAMPC technique is that it includes an explicit operational 
definition of its process and is therefore perceived as a systematic risk management 
process compared to the regular STAMP technique. Our findings showed that the 
checklist could detect additional information to prevent failures and reduce the number 
of risk factors that led to failures. The study continued for another two consecutive 
months. 
For the two consequent months, the hospital’s units continued using the 
checklist every week as planned by the researcher during the study. The quality 
management team reported that the EMR system failure in the hospital reduced to nil 
for two months. We expected that the EMR systems failure would be reduced to the 
lowest rate (less than once a year) if the application of the STAMPC continued as 
planned. This finding showed the benefits of applying a checklist with STAMP. The 
data extracted using STAMPC, provided users and managers with useful information to 
prevent failures and to improve safety in the context of a hospital that has identifiable 
issues with their ERM system. 
6. Discussion 
Previous studies in Saudi Arabia showed that their EMR were still not mature due to the 
lack of periodic maintenance and management. Traditional brainstorming risk 
management techniques were used in some hospitals to detect risks and prevent failures 
[57]. However, no systematic risk management technique had been applied in hospital 
in Saudi Arabia before. 
This study consists of two phases. During the first phase we applied the STAMP 
technique to identify risks of the EMR systems, and possible causes of failures. The 
main findings from this phase were, inadequate incident reporting to the hospital 
manager from the IT department and end users, inadequate constraints imposed by the 
IT manager on end users, inadequate periodic maintenance of hardware/software and 
other infrastructure, lack of feedback between IT department and other levels in the 
hierarchy and poor identification as well as management of risks. 
During the second phase, our proposed method, namely STAMPC, was used for 
a period of two months. Main objective of this stage was to identify further causal 
factors in addition to the findings of the first phase in order to mitigate risks and reduce 
weekly EMR failures. The main outcome of the application of STAMPC was the 
reduction of the EMR failure rate from once every week to nearly once every month. 
Compared to the STAMP technique, STAMPC technique has been provided to be more 
affective. Data extracted using STAMPC were found to be useful for both stakeholders 
and users for improving safety and preventing potential system failures. Moreover, the 
STAMPC technique ensures that all interactions between different organisational levels, 
throughout the EMR system life cycle, are taken into account. STAMPC facilitates the 
identification, development and implementation of strategies and procedures that are 
necessary to identify and avoid potential risks [58, 59]. 
7. Conclusions and future work 
This study sets out to tackle two important problems, namely, continuous system 
failures and the lack of risk management technique usage in hospitals in Saudi Arabia. 
Previous research in the Saudi Arabia healthcare organisations showed that there was a 
low level of quality in hospital services, which was due to the lack of effective risk 
management policies, risk assessment procedures and project management [57]. This 
research applied the STAMP technique to detect risks and analysed system failures of 
KKG hospitals that use EMR system. Specifically, the technique was used to help 
system stakeholders, including providers and end users, consider the system through its 
entire life cycle and take into account all interactions between different levels in the 
hierarchy. The obvious advantage of STAMP technique was that it provided an 
opportunity (and reason) to create an overall view of the entire system dealing with 
interactions between humans, the organisations and technologies. The use of STAMP 
guided users to identify the causal factors of incidents. STAMP technique made it 
possible to identify potential risks by providing detailed scenarios involving incident 
components. 
The application of the STAMP technique with the addition of a checklist, the 
STAMPC technique, in a real hospital environment, significantly improved the quality 
of the hospital’s performance and reduced systems’ failure rate. The incorporation of 
the checklist with the STAMP technique has been proven to be useful. By using this 
tool, the root causes of failures were identified, allowing the hospital to avoid potential 
system failures and other adverse incidents. This case study has provided the first 
testing of the use of the risk assessment technique STAMP in an EMR system in the 
KSA and has made a significant contribution in reducing the failure rate of the local 
hospital, KKGH. The study also contributed to the knowledge by broadening the scope 
of literature on EMR systems and effective RM in hospitals in Saudi Arabia and 
elsewhere, in particular, by proposing a new method, namely STAMPC, to identify and 
mitigate system failures. Further studies should encompass wider and different 
geographical healthcare providers, including both public and private sectors. Future 
work will also include the adaption of the STAMPC to meet specific needs of other 























Appendix A.  
 
Table A1.   STAMP Checklist for RM in EMR Systems 
No. Review Required Yes No I don’t know 
1 Have   you   received   updated   EMR  policies    
 and procedure from MOH or the Information    
 Technology  unit recently?    
2 Do the policies involve instruction for contact-    
 ing IT expert 24-hours a day?    
3 Are you aware of the policies, procedures   and    
 standards  of  this hospital?    
4 Have  all users been trained, on the   hospital    
 and the IT security policies and    procedure?    
5 Do only authorised staffs have access to   the    
 system?    
6 Do all users have passwords and   usernames?    
7 Do you know whom to contact in case of 
system 
   
 incident?    
8 Is your computer protected by virus protection    
 software?    
9 Does  your  computer  receive  virus protection    
 updates?    
10 Has the IT technicians performed system soft-    
 ware maintenance this  week?    
11 When was the last hardware precaution main- 6M 12M Never Heard 
 tenance done?  
12 Have  you filled in any incident report     this 
 week? 
13 Have you received feedback for previous  inci- 
 dent report? 
14 If the IT technician dose not respond, does a 
 procedure exist for escalating the problem    to 
 the hospital manager? 
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